Boycotts against the tobacco industry

Who undertook action: White Citizens Council

Type: White supremacist organization

Size: Small

Years: 1956-1958

Scope: Regional, mainly U.S. south

Targeted companies: Philip Morris (PM)

Focus of action: Philip Morris cigarette

Concurrent events: PM received awards for supporting the African American community (hiring practices, scholarships, charitable contributions)

Industry behavior change sought: Stop supporting African American community

'''Smokers / smoking a focus? '''Yes, smokers urged to switch to other manufacturer

Main strategy: Boycott

Supporting strategies: Minimal press, almost exclusively in organization's newsletter

'''Well-funded? '''No

Breadth of campaign: Narrow, little support; Ku Klux Klan endorsed it

Evidence of effectiveness: Boycotters claimed PM suffered loss, but financial statements refute assertion

Industry response: White industry reps reached out to white community; a black rep reached out to black community;

Resolution: Boycott lost steam, petered out

Industry gains/losses: Decades later, PM used the fact that it was boycotted by racists to curry favor with African Americans when it was charged with targeting the community. At that time, PM claimed the boycott hurt the company financially, although it had earlier said there was no impact.

Community gains/losses: Insignificant during boycott, but potentially harmful to African Americans years later when PM used the fact of the boycott to ally itself with African Americans and market to them

'''Good for tobacco control? '''No, health was never an issue.

Observations: A boycott that does not address harms of tobacco unlikely to benefit tobacco control; as an invitation to negotiate, a boycott legitimizes the industry and often gives it a marketing advantage.

Links: The perimetric boycott: a tool for tobacco control advocacy

Who undertook action: Coalition of 18 national Jewish organizations

Type: Jewish community advocacy organizations

Size: Variable, represented majority of organized Jewish community

Years: 1956-61

Scope: National, USA

Targeted companies: Brown and Williamson (B&W), an affiliate of British American Tobacco (BAT)

Focus of action: All B&W cigarette brands

Concurrent events: In 1956, B&W parent BAT agreed to Arab demands not to sell certain brands of cigarettes in Israel

Industry behavior change sought: B&W / BAT resume cigarette sales to Israel

'''Smokers / smoking a focus? '''Yes

Main strategy: Boycott

Supporting strategies: Demonstrations, publicity

'''Well-funded? '''unknown

Breadth of campaign: Widespread Jewish community support; additional support from Italian-American organizations

Evidence of effectiveness: Internal documents revealed company was concerned and claimed a loss of sales

Industry response: Company developed a plan to settle the strike and woo the Jewish community

Resolution: B&W capitulated, resumed sales to Israel, advertised that fact in Jewish press while otherwise maintaining low profile to avoid offending Arab nations

Industry gains/losses: Industry big winner; used resolution of boycott as entree to Jewish market. Supported Jewish organizations, funded scholarships, recruited Jewish newspapers to promote Viceroy cigarette, negotiated with American Jewish Committee to have B&W president receive humanitarian award

Community gains/losses: Community flexed its muscle successfully to achieve its goal and became recipient of company's largesse, but was unmindful of the long-term health consequences of B&W cigarette sales in the Jewish community

'''Good for tobacco control? '''No, health was never an issue.

Observations: A boycott that does not address harms of tobacco unlikely to benefit tobacco control; as an invitation to negotiate, a boycott legitimizes the industry and often gives it a marketing advantage.

Links: The perimetric boycott: a tool for tobacco control advocacy

Who undertook action: Georgians Against Smoking Pollution (GASP); (Stop Teenage Addiction to Tobacco (STAT);  Infact (Corporate Accountability International)

Type: Tobacco control / corporate responsibility organizations

Size: Small core groups, some with large mailing lists

Years: 1984-2003

Scope: Regional, national (USA) and international

Targeted companies: Philip Morris (PM), RJ Reynolds (RJR)

Focus of action: Food products of tobacco companies

Concurrent events: Industry was becoming increasingly unpopular, Joe Camel cartoon campaign riled advocates, industry CEO's told Congress they didn't believe nicotine was addictive

Industry behavior change sought: Stop marketing that appeals to young people; stop spreading tobacco addiction internationally; stop influence over and interference in public policy on issues of tobacco and health; stop deceiving people about the dangers of tobacco; and pay the high costs of health care associated with the tobacco epidemic

'''Smokers / smoking a focus? '''No, industry's food products were selected targets in order to engage general public

Main strategy: Boycott

Supporting strategies: Demonstrations, petitions, letter writing

'''Well-funded? '''Moderately

Breadth of campaign: Engaged religious and youth groups; obtained some celebrity endorsements; Infact claimed 200 groups participating at height of action

Evidence of effectiveness: Documents show industry very concerned about potential of boycott

Industry response: Surveillance of activists, downplaying / ignoring boycott

Resolution: Infact declared victory upon adoption of international treaty, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), and ended boycott

Industry gains/losses: Industry resources expended to deal with boycott, but no significant financial impact

Community gains/losses: Public educated about extent of tobacco industry holdings and tactics; none of demands satisfied

'''Good for tobacco control? '''Unknown, too soon to tell whether industry will try to claim that Infact's declaration of victory meant that PM and RJR met demands for corporate responsibility

Observations: As an invitation to negotiate, a boycott can legitimize the industry; demands must be clear and measurable; tobacco industry itself not a promising target for health-focused boycott

Links: The perimetric boycott: a tool for tobacco control advocacy

Who undertook action: AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT-UP)

Type: Grass roots AIDS advocacy organization with multiple independent chapters

Size: dozens to hundreds of members

Years: 1990-1991

Scope: National, USA

Targeted companies: Philip Morris (PM) and affiliate Miller Beer

Focus of action: Marlboro cigarettes, Miller beer

Concurrent events: PM had made sizable contributions to Jesse Helms library and campaigns. AIDS epidemic raging, eclipsing every other health concern in the minds of some gay activists

Industry behavior change sought: End financial support for NC Senator Jesse Helms (outspoken foe of AIDS funding and LGBT rights); contribute to AIDS/LGBT causes

'''Smokers / smoking a focus? '''Boycott expanded to include Miller Beer (after initial focus on Marlboro alone) in order to engage nonsmokers in the action; no focus on danger of tobacco, smoking treated neutrally

Main strategy: Boycott

Supporting strategies: Demonstrations, press conferences, letters, petitions

'''Well-funded? '''Not well-funded, grass-roots action

Breadth of campaign: Largely confined to LGBT and AIDS activist communities; almost no support from tobacco control

Evidence of effectiveness: Some press coverage, mostly in gay press; industry willing to negotiate

Industry response: Strategic documents in PM’s files about how best to respond to boycott (downplay or ignore); editorial from PM executive in gay press touting PM’s support for AIDS services and branding ACT-UP as a fringe group; lawsuit against some organizers.

Resolution: Leaders of boycott negotiated with PM, who agreed to make large contributions to AIDS organizations, but refused to sever ties to Helms. Some boycotters felt betrayed.

Industry gains/losses: PM claimed boycott had little to no financial impact. PM used this action against it to cultivate LGBT market by building relationships with AIDS/LGBT groups, recruiting LGBT allies for the industry, advertising in the gay press for the first time, and improving its image as generous donor. Relatively minor expenditure of PM's resources to deal with boycott

Community gains/losses: Some AIDS organizations received sizable donations. There was almost no consideration of the long-term health consequences of tobacco in the LGBT community.

'''Good for tobacco control? '''No, industry used resolution of boycott to gain entree to new market; tobacco health hazards not an issue in the boycott

Observations: A boycott that does not address harms of tobacco unlikely to benefit tobacco control; as an invitation to negotiate, a boycott legitimizes the industry and often gives it a marketing advantage.

Links: From adversary to target market: the ACT-UP boycott of Philip Morris

Who undertook action: Coalition of Lavender-Americans on Smoking and Health (CLASH)

Type: LGBT tobacco control organization

Size: 8-10 people

Years: 2001-2003

Scope: San Francisco Bay Area, California, USA

Targeted companies: Brown & Williamson (B&W)

Focus of action: Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD), a national LGBT media watchdog membership organization, that for several years hosted Lucky Strike smoking lounges for B&W at annual GLAAD Media Awards banquets in NY, LA and SF.

Concurrent events: Growing awareness of tobacco threat within LGBT community

Industry behavior change sought: None

'''Smokers / smoking a focus? '''No

Main strategy: Threat of perimetric boycott (boycott of those on the perimeter of the industry, e.g., retailers or beneficiaries) At stake was the good will toward GLAAD that translated into financial support for the organization (memberships and donations)

Supporting strategies: Calling attention to GLAAD's role in supporting smoking; demonstrations, publicity, letter writing campaign; award-winning documentary made about smoking lounge

'''Well-funded? '''No, grass roots

Breadth of campaign: Activists involved supporters of GLAAD in lobbying organization for policy change

Evidence of effectiveness: Former U.S. Ambassador Jim Hormel criticized GLAAD for hosting smoking lounges from banquet podium; favorable articles in LGBT press

Industry response: This action bypassed the industry. No response was sought from industry and none was forthcoming.

Resolution: GLAAD ended smoking lounges in 2003

Industry gains/losses: B&W lost a venue for promoting smoking as well as the public relations benefit of associating with highly respected organization; industry further isolated

Community gains/losses: LGBT community won one more smokefree venue; GLAAD forfeited $15,000 annually from B&W; GLAAD held accountable by community

'''Good for tobacco control? '''Yes, marginalizing industry helps denormalize smoking; action sparked debate about issue in community

Observations: Organizations that depend on good will of the public for their funding may be persuaded to sever ties to tobacco industry.

Links: The perimetric boycott: a tool for tobacco control advocacy