Charles A. Duelfer

Charles A. Duelfer replaced David Kay in the Iraq Survey Group (March 2004). This is what Scott Ritter had to say about the ISG and Duelfer


 * A new organisation was created, the CIA-led Iraq survey group (ISG), led by David Kay. His job was not to find WMD but to spin the data for the political benefit of the White House. He hinted at dramatic findings, only to suddenly reverse course once Saddam Hussein was captured. Kay told us that everyone had got it wrong on WMD, that it was no one's fault. He was replaced by Charles Duelfer, whose task was to extend the WMD cover-up for as long as possible. Duelfer was very adept at this, having done similar work while serving as the deputy executive chairman of the UN weapons inspection effort.
 * I witnessed him manipulate reports to the security council, rejecting all that didn't sustain his (and the US government's) foregone conclusion that Iraq had WMD.
 * As the head of the ISG, he was called upon to again manipulate the data. As it was virtually impossible to conjure up WMD stockpiles where none existed, he did the next best thing - he re-certified Colin Powell's pre-war assertion that Saddam Hussein had the "intent" to re-acquire WMD. Duelfer provided no evidence to support this supposition. In fact, the available data seems to reject the notion of "intent". But once again, politicians, the mainstream media and the public at large failed to let facts get in the way of assertions. The ISG had accomplished its mission - not the search for WMD, but the establishment of a viable alibi. Its job done, the ISG slipped quietly away, its passing barely noticed by politicians, media and a public all too willing to pretend that no crime has been committed. &mdash; Scott Ritter, Criminals the lot of us, The Guardian, January 27, 2005.

Education

 * B.A., University of Connecticut
 * M.S., Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Resume

 * 1977-83 - White House Office of Management and Budget; responsible for the DoD's strategic nuclear forces and space programs
 * 1983-92 - State Department
 * 1983 - Politico-Military Bureau; responsiblities included regional conflicts in Chad, Libya, and Grenada, strategic verification, as well as space and strategic defense issues
 * 1984 - Office of International Security Policy, deputy director responsible for Europe, Africa and Latin America
 * 1985 - Office of International Security Policy, director
 * 1990-92 - Center for Defense Trade, director
 * 1991 - State Department Task Force in support of Desert Storm, director
 * 1993-2000 - United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, deputy executive chairman
 * 2004-05 - Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction

Think Tank Affiliations

 * 2003-04 - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs Public Policy Scholar
 * ?? - Center for Strategic and International Studies, Visiting Resident Scholar, Middle East Studies

Publications

 * "The Inevitable Failure of Inspections in Iraq", Arms Control Today, September 2002
 * "Arms Reduction: The Role of International Organizations, The UNSCOM Experience", Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2000), Vol. 5 No. 1, fee access

External Resources

 * Excerpts of CNN interview with Charles Duelfer, "Inside UNSCOM: The Inspector", CNN, February 13 1998
 * Scott Ritter, The source Duelfer didn't quote, The Guardian, October 9, 2004
 * Scott Ritter, Criminals the lot of us, The Guardian, January 27, 2005
 * US Senate Armed Services Committee, "Testimony of Charles Duelfer" - (PDF file), October 6, 2005
 * Statement of Charles A. Duelfer to the House Committee on International Relations, 17 November 2004
 * Dana Priest and Walter Pincus, "U.S. 'Almost All Wrong' on Weapons - Report on Iraq Contradicts Bush Administration Claims", Washington Post, October 7, 2004.

Affiliations

 * Central Intelligence Agency
 * Iraq Survey Group